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Abstract 
 
This paper explores the relationship between corporate foresight and the capability of the 
organization to respond successfully to external changes (i.e., strategic agility). More generally, 
we investigate the value that firms, facing growing uncertainty because of the fast pace of 
external changes, create through foresight. We base our analysis on three different research 
streams: the first one is literature on environmental uncertainty; the second one is literature on 
strategic planning and first mover (dis)advantages; the third one is literature on organizational 
learning and organizational memories. We thus focus on two fundamental questions which 
characterize the interaction between turbulent environments, foresight and long-term 
performances: what kind of knowledge should organizations achieve in order to sustain their 
competitive edge? Under what conditions can this knowledge enhance strategic agility?  
 
Keywords: Environmental uncertainty; corporate foresight; adaptation; inertia; competitive 
advantage. 
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1.  Introduction  
Among the most critical challenges in business is creating strategy for the future – particularly in 
the case of an organization that is doing well. How do we know what we have to do next? In 
many cases this question is not asked or answered, being the course simply maintained until a 
threat or an opportunity crashes into the organization. However, in recent years the fast pace of 
new events and changes have considerably increased the volatility and complexity of the business 
environment [1]. In a chaotic world in which markets and entire industries continuously emerge, 
collide, split, evolve, and decline, one of the primary determinants of success is the ability of the 
firm to cope with uncertainty, by enhancing its resilience  and adaptation to the changing 
environment [2,3,4].  
The challenge of coping with growing environmental uncertainty encouraged reconsideration 
of both the processes and nature of strategic decision making, including various practices and 
techniques which today are commonly used in a wide set of industries. Scholars developed tools 
for managing uncertainty at the level of innovation projects [5,6], capital budgeting and capital 
structure policies [7,8,9]. More generally, scholars investigated the future-oriented techniques 
that might be used for enhancing decision-making at the level of business and corporate strategy 
[10]. Some of the most popular techniques are environmental scanning, product and technology 
roadmaps, scenarios and real options. Environmental scanning concerns the detection of new 
events and drivers of change [11,12]. Roadmaps consist of representations of interconnected 
nodes of major changes and events in selected fields, i.e. science, technologies, markets and 
products. The connecting links between nodes are the roadmaps themselves, illustrating their 
causal and temporal inter-relationships [13]. Scenarios are focused descriptions of fundamentally 
different paths, presented in a script-like or narrative fashion, which tell coherent and credible 
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stories leading to alternative futures [14,15,16]. Real options involve the application of financial 
options theory to investment decisions on real assets: the approach emphasizes that many initial 
investments (for example market tests, joint ventures, or operating licenses) create relevant 
opportunities that give the firm the chance (but not the obligation) to make subsequent follow-on 
investments [17,18,19].  
A survey of the US companies revealed that by the ‘80s almost half of the US Fortune 1000 
industrial companies were using future-oriented techniques for supporting their planning 
processes [20]; a similar pattern was followed by European firms [21]. More recently, scholars 
have documented that many large firms in such diverse sectors as energy, automotive, 
telecommunications, and information technology have been regularly applying future-oriented 
techniques [22,23,24,25]. This wide interest seems to be confirmed by the growing number of 
consulting companies and networks in the field: relevant examples are GBN (Global Business 
Network) in the United States and EIRMA (European Industrial Research Management 
Association) in the European Union.  
In this context, the term ‘strategic foresight’ (or alternatively, ‘corporate foresight’) has now 
become widely used to encompass the activities that help decision makers in the task of 
sustaining the company’s future growth and success [26,27]. In particular, according to 
mainstream scholars in the field, we define strategic foresight as the set of techniques, practices 
and processes that organizations use for: detecting new events and changes in their external 
environment; exploring their likely evolution and effects; and defining response options 
[28,29,30].  A key feature of strategic foresight is the premise that the future is neither predictable 
nor predetermined, but it might be influenced by the present choices of the organization and other 
relevant players in its business [31]. Strategic foresight thus tries to envisage alternative futures, 
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by strongly differentiating from previous future-oriented approaches like forecasting – i.e. the 
process of making accurate statements about future events [32]. (The term ‘prediction’ is also 
used with a similar meaning. However, forecasts tend to be more accurate statements of future 
events – e.g.: “sales of smartphones will be 1,5 billion in 2015” -whereas predictions are more 
general – e.g.: “sales of smartphones will continue to grow in the next few years”).   
On the other hand, despite the widespread diffusion of strategic foresight in corporate 
organizations, some skepticism arose in the academic community about the effectiveness of its 
contribution to long term performances [26,1,33]. The major evidence of this skepticism may be 
the fact that today, apart from a few exceptions, there are a limited number of primary academic 
journals that regularly host papers addressing this research field. It is worth noting as well that 
foresight techniques are not specifically addressed by most MBA curricula: many managers in 
charge of strategic foresight activities in prominent companies pointed out to us that they had 
great difficulty in finding and recruiting the skills they required among MBA and Ph.D. 
graduates. 
Increasing criticism about the effectiveness of corporate foresight has emphasized the 
impossibility of making reliable enough visions of the future: while relatively accurate in the 
short term, foresight accuracy diminishes in the medium and long term as political, economic, 
social and technological drivers of change interact in novel and unforeseeable ways [34]. Hamel 
[35] supported the idea that the best way to handle an uncertain future is simply to ignore it; 
Drucker [36: p. 98] claimed that “prediction is not a worthwhile managerial activity”.  
Scholars and practitioners in the field of strategic foresight responded to such growing 
criticism by arguing that its role is not actually to anticipate the future as “it exactly will be”, but 
to prepare the organization for future challenges. Corporate foresight would set the stage for a 
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learning process that fosters the flexibility and strategic agility of the organization, i.e. its 
capability to respond to changes in the external environment [1, 37]. In particular, as he studied 
several corporate organizations, Vecchiato [38] introduced the concept of ‘planned learning’ to 
outline the likely value of foresight activities and the kind of benefits organizations pursue 
through foresight efforts. However, he did not investigate under which conditions firms might 
concretely create this value, i.e. what are the essential mechanisms that enable this process of 
‘planned learning’ to occur. Thus there is the need to fill a gap in literature on strategy and to 
develop a more complete and theoretically rich understanding of corporate foresight and the long-
term value it might bring in dynamic environments. In this paper we focus exactly on this issue; 
we ask: whether and under what circumstances does corporate foresight enhance the strategic 
agility of the organization?  
In order to investigate our research questions, we draw from three different research streams: 
the first one is literature on environmental uncertainty, a concept which we carefully re-examine 
in this paper; the second one is literature on strategic planning and first mover advantages; the 
third one is literature on organizational learning and organizational memories. Two fundamental 
issues characterize the interaction between environmental uncertainty, strategic foresight, and the 
long term performance of the firm: the first, regards what kind of knowledge (i.e., ‘memory’ of 
the future) organizations should build through foresight; the second, regards under what 
conditions this knowledge might bring to superior learning and adaptive skills.   
Although this article is theoretical in nature, its insights are significantly based on 
empirical findings. We have been involved in the past ten years in the investigation of foresight 
practices in several leading firms of different industries (ICT, automotive, energy, home 
appliances).  
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The contribution of this paper is twofold. Building on previous work of scholars [38], first we 
emphasize that the value of strategic foresight lies not just in the alternative visions of the future 
it provides, but actually in how it fosters a process of ‘planned learning’ about external changes. 
This research thus adds to our knowledge in the field by exploring and shedding light on the key 
requisites for this ‘planned learning’ process. Second, this paper develops a research agenda that 
may lead to further theoretical and empirical work on the nature and effects of strategic foresight 
activities and their role in the future growth of the firm. It links the work on strategic foresight 
with other research streams (i.e., dynamic capabilities and strategic agility, organizational 
learning and organizational memory) which are enjoying growing popularity in literature on 
management, thus revealing new connections and issues to explore.  
 
 
 
2. Environmental uncertainty, strategic planning and organizational learning 
2.1  Environmental uncertainty: components, and features 
There is no surprise that environmental uncertainty has established as a key issue in literature on 
strategic management: the competitive landscape has been changing in recent years more quickly 
than ever. Globalization, the rapid pace of technological development, codification of knowledge, 
the Internet, talent and employee mobility, increased rates of technology transfer, the continuous 
emergence of new customer needs and the quick innovation of products and business models: all 
these factors contributed to increase industry turbulence and thereby the overall level of 
uncertainty faced by decision makers [1].  
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Environmental uncertainty regards the difficulty of managers to understand what the major 
events or changes in their industry are and how they will affect their organization [39]. Early 
conceptualizations of uncertainty go back to pioneering management scholars such as Knight 
[40] March and Simon [41] and Cyert and March [42]. These scholars argued  that managers are 
forced to make decisions under conditions of “bounded rationality.” Bounded rationality involves 
the “choice of courses of action in an environment which does not fully disclose the alternatives 
available or the consequences of those alternatives” [43]. A logical result of bounded rationality 
is that managers and firms are not able to fully collect, process, and comprehend information 
about changes and new events. Environmental uncertainty arises exactly when managers lack 
accurate information about organizations, activities, and events in their external environment; 
namely, when they are not confident that they can anticipate what the major changes are or will 
be [39]. This lack of information poses relevant problems for managers as it creates ambiguity 
throughout decision making processes [44]. Together with the lack of information, Lawrence and 
Lorsch [45] identified two further determinants of environmental uncertainty. The first one is the 
long time span required for feedback after strategic actions: even after managers have formulated 
and implemented their strategic responses to external changes, they still cannot be sure if they 
have achieved a fit with these changes. The second determinant of uncertainty introduced by 
Lawrence and Lorsch regards the (mutual) causal relationships between the strategic actions 
implemented by an organization and their effects on the business environment: as strategic 
actions are implemented, they bring about reactions by other industry players which cannot be 
anticipated ex-ante.  
As he explored and classified the external environment of an organization and the main 
sources of uncertainty , Dill [46] made the distinction between the ‘general’ and the ‘task’ 
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environment. The latter one is made up of elements and sectors with which the firm has direct 
contact and that affect directly business strategy, day-to-day operations, and goal attainment. 
According to the organization theory, the task environment was initially defined to include the 
sectors of competitors, suppliers, customers, and regulatory bodies [44]. Afterwards strategic 
management scholars expanded the concept of the task environment by defining the broader 
notion of business ‘microenvironment’, which identifies the key forces (sectors) that govern 
competition in an industry. These forces are competitors, customers, suppliers, potential incomers 
and substitute products [47], and providers of complementary products [48]. The 
microenvironment encompasses drivers of change that usually originate inside the industry and 
regard new technologies, customer needs and regulations. The general environment refers, 
instead, to the sectors that affect firms indirectly; these are the political, economic, ecological, 
societal, and technological landscapes that surround the business microenvironment and today are 
commonly referred to as the business ‘macroenvironment’ [14]. The greatest threats for 
incumbents are often due to technologies developed outside their industry - and thereby for 
serving other goals than the traditional needs of mainstream customers. At the time they are made 
available to mainstream customers, such technologies are still so unperfected that the established 
technology offers better performance or cost; but afterwards, if the new technology has real 
merit, it improves quickly its performance-price ratio, and ends up invading the industry by 
enabling products with superior or innovative features, at lower or comparable cost [49]. 
Similarly, macro changes in politics, economics, ecology and society can strongly affect the 
industry structure and its attractiveness in the long run, by opening the doors to new customers 
groups and/or by introducing new products features compared with the ones that mainstream 
customers were used to require. 
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Building on these contributions, Duncan [39] explored two specific environmental features 
which combine to increase the general level of uncertainty: complexity and pace of external 
changes. Complexity results from: i) heterogeneity of drivers of change and new events in the 
business environment; ii) the relationships and mutual influences among drivers of change, and 
the relationships of each driver with a large number of components of the micro and macro 
environments; iii) the low rate of evolution of drivers of change. The more heterogeneous the 
drivers of change are, the longer their development time and the more tightly they are linked (that 
is, the more they influence each other), the higher the complexity of the business environment 
will be. Complexity is typical of mature and global industries where trajectories of technologies 
and customer needs are well-established and companies compete for market share at the 
international level. The boundaries between the micro and macro environments are blurred in 
these industries; the huge number of drivers of change in the macroenvironment, their strong 
mutual influences and the slow overall pace of evolution contribute to increase complexity 
markedly. In contrast, dynamism is the result of: i) the frequency of the rise of new and 
disruptive drivers of change; ii) the speed of the evolution of these drivers. The more frequently 
disruptive drivers of change emerge, and the faster their development is, the higher the dynamism 
of the business environment will be. Dynamism is typical of emerging industries and more 
generally of industries where technology is the main leading force and new customer needs 
continuously come to the fore. 
More recently, Milliken [50] explored the different types of uncertainty that strategic 
decision makers might face. He thus distinguished between three specific types: the first one is 
uncertainty about the state of the environment (‘state’ uncertainty): managers experience such 
kind of uncertainty when they perceive a particular component of their external environment to 
  - 12 - 
be unpredictable, i.e. when they do not feel able to understand how this component might evolve 
over time.  Recently such notion has been expanded by Courtney [51]. A second and quite 
different kind of uncertainty about the environment relates to managers’ inability to predict the 
impact of external changes on the organization: this is exactly what Milliken [50] defines ‘effect’ 
uncertainty. Finally, a third type of uncertainty is associated with attempts to understand what 
response options are available to the organization and what the value or utility of each option 
might be. Milliken [50] defines ‘response’ uncertainty as the lack of knowledge of response 
options and/or the inability to predict their consequences.  
 
2.2 Strategic planning and first mover (late mover) advantages  
Studies in mainstream strategic management have developed around two fundamental 
prescriptions for how firms can cope with environmental uncertainty: they should either try 
harder to make more accurate predictions (rational strategies advocated by the “planning school”) 
or be more flexible in order to adapt fast (adaptive strategies espoused by the “learning school”). 
This section and the next one focus on these research strands.  
The ‘planning school’ argues that, as uncertainty increases, organizations that work more 
diligently to predict changes in their environment will outperform those that do not. This 
approach therefore emphasizes the importance of systematic analysis and integrative planning, 
and discipline in the scanning of trends, the generation of alternatives and forecasts, the rational 
evaluation of these forecasts and their integration into the firm’s existing operations: these are the 
hallmarks of the planning school [52,47]. Scholars recognize that predictions might not be perfect 
because they are obviously difficult; however, predictions still represent the best way for 
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remaining aligned with the changing environment, by allowing decision makers to identify 
emerging opportunities and threats.  
In this vein, mainstream scholars define “first mover advantages” the main benefits that a firm 
might gain by anticipating – and thus by pioneering – market changes and, conversely, the 
disadvantages encountered by late mover firms that fail to anticipate such changes [53]. First 
mover advantages tend to be observed mainly in the form of higher profits and market share: the 
longer the lead time of competitive entry – and thereby the longer the time a firm anticipate 
external changes before its rivals – the higher the likelihood of achieving such benefits [54].  
According to mainstream scholars, the main sources of first mover advantages lie in three 
basic categories: technological capabilities, customers’ switching costs, and scarce inputs or 
assets [55]. The first source typically relates to technological changes which might stem from 
both the core industry (microenvironment) of the firm or from its macro-environment. Two basic 
mechanisms here are considered in literature on management: the first relates to advantages 
derived from the ‘learning’ curve, where costs fall with cumulative output; the second relates to 
success in patent or R&D races, or more simply to superior technological skills, where 
competitive edges in product or process features are a function of R&D expenditures [56]. 
Equally important, first mover advantages might also be achieved through the timely 
development of a set of organizational capabilities in marketing or manufacturing that are key to 
the establishment of new products and services; such marketing and manufacturing capabilities 
are likely to be affected as well by the learning curve.  
The second source of first mover advantages, i.e. customers’ switching costs, relates to the 
extra resources which late movers must invest in order to attract customers away from the first 
mover firms [53]. This source is typically due to technological and market changes in the micro 
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environment of the firm which lead to the rise of new customer needs. First, switching costs can 
stem from initial transaction costs or investments that the buyer makes in adapting to the seller’s 
product. These include the time and resources spent in qualifying a new supplier, the cost of 
ancillary products such as software applications for a new operating system in the computer 
industry, and the time and financial burdens of training employees. A second category of 
switching costs is due to supplier-specific learning by the buyer. As the buyer adapts over time to 
the characteristics of the product and its supplier, he eventually finds it costly to switch to another 
brand. A third type of switching cost is contractual switching cost that may be intentionally 
created by the seller: airline frequent-flyer programs are compelling examples of this category 
[55].  
 Finally, first mover firms may be able to gain advantages by pre-empting rivals in the 
acquisition of scarce assets. Such assets may be physical resources or other process inputs: that’s 
typically the case of changes in regulation or in the political landscape which enable the access to 
new markets or geographic areas. In the early 1990s, the fall of the Soviet Union allowed energy 
majors to expand their exploration activities in the country with the largest reserves of oil and gas 
in the world. Alternatively, scarce assets may relate to positioning in ‘space’, including 
geographic space, product space, shelf space, or even customers perceptual space. On this regard, 
it is worth stressing that early entrants might be able to shape the cost and preference structure of 
customers: that’s the case for instance of network externalities which tend to establish the 
pioneer’s product as the industry standard. As they accumulate experience with the pioneer’s 
products and enjoy lower cost or greater benefits when using them – thanks to the compatibility 
with the largest base of external users -, customers increasingly become reluctant to switch to the 
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offer of late mover firms [48]. In this case, the pre-emption of scarce resources by early movers 
regards the size of its customer base.    
On the other hand, first mover advantages may be counterbalanced by various disadvantages 
which can reduce, or even completely negate, the benefits which pioneer firms derive from the 
sources described previously. The full understanding of the opportunities inherent in the sources 
of first mover advantages thus requires to analyse systematically and contextually these first 
mover disadvantages which are, in effect, advantages enjoyed by late mover firms. First, late 
movers may benefit from the ability to “free-ride” on first mover investments in a number of 
areas including R&D, buyer education, and infrastructure development: imitation costs are often 
lower than innovation costs. Second, late movers might benefit from the resolution of 
technological and market uncertainty. Firms’ size is a key issue on this regard: large firms usually 
control complementary resources in marketing (e.g. brands, distribution channels) and production 
(e.g., facilities) which allow them to easily bridge the time gap with small-sized innovators. 
Third, the vulnerability of first movers might stem from incumbents’ inertia. Such inertia can 
have several root causes: a) incumbent firms may be locked-in to a specific set of fixed assets; b) 
they may be reluctant to cannibalize existing product lines; c) they may become organizationally 
inflexible. These factors inhibit the ability of first mover firms to respond to new environmental 
changes or competitive threats. 
 
2.3 Organizational leaning and adaptation 
Contrary to the planning school, the ‘learning school’ prescribes avoiding prediction as much as 
possible, but focussing rather on responding to change events as they emerge. This strand 
emphasizes quick adaptation: it suggests firms maximize their profits by minimizing the use of 
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predictive rationality, and by experimenting instead so as to be able to move quickly to capture 
emerging opportunities [57,58]. The ‘learning school’ advocates using purely reactive approaches 
which avoid trying to define future changes and seek instead to position the firm to make timely 
responses to actual events and changes. This approach ultimately argues that the impossibility to 
make reliable enough predictions represents an insurmountable barrier to strategic planning, by 
compromising its real effectiveness. 
Organizational learning builds on two classical observations drawn from behavioral studies of 
organizations. The first is that behavior in organizations is based on routines [42,59]. Actions 
stem from a logic of appropriateness or legitimacy more than from a logic of consequentiality or 
analysis: they involve matching procedures to situations rather than planning alternatives. The 
second observation is that organizational actions are history-dependent [60]. According to Levitt 
and March [61: p. 320] organizations are seen:  
“as learning by encoding inferences from history into routines that guide behavior. The 
generic term ‘routines’ includes the forms, rules, procedures, conventions, strategies, and 
technologies around which organizations are constructed and through which they operate. 
It also includes the structure of beliefs, frameworks, paradigms, codes, cultures, and 
knowledge that buttress, elaborate, and contradict the formal routines. Routines are 
independent of the individual actors who execute them and are capable of surviving 
considerable turnover in individual actors.” 
 
Organizational routines continuously change as a result of experience and interpretation of 
history, i.e. evaluation of outcomes in terms of targets. The likelihood that a routine will be used 
increases when it is associated with success in meeting a target, decreases when it is associated 
with failure [42]. To describe the underlying processes through which routines develop and 
change, and thereby organizations learn from their actions and the feedback they receive from 
their environment, Nonaka and Takeuchi [62] introduced a four-stage spiral model based on the 
distinction between “tacit” and “explicit” knowledge. Tacit knowledge is hard to be formalized 
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and therefore to be communicated; it consists basically of personal know-how, mental models 
and individual beliefs, deeply rooted in a specific context. It’s the case, for example, of the 
craftsmanship of silk printing, that is the ability of reproducing on a piece of silk exactly the 
shape or the combination of colours of a given sketch: such a craftsmanship is the result of 
several years of experience that cannot be simply articulated in terms of scientific or technical 
principles and operational routines. Ultimately tacit knowledge consists of what we know and 
what can do, even if we cannot explain it. Explicit knowledge, on the other hand, is formal and 
systematic and, as such, it can be easily communicated through archives and records. The 
distinction between tacit and explicit knowledge leads to four stages of the process of knowledge 
creation and organizational learning: a) socialization, that is the sharing of tacit knowledge 
between different individuals (from tacit to tacit); b) articulation, that is the conversion of tacit 
knowledge into explicit knowledge (from tacit to explicit); c) combination, that is the collection 
and assembly of discrete pieces of explicit knowledge (from explicit to explicit); d) 
internalization, that is the use and further elaboration of explicit knowledge to widen one’s own 
stock of tacit knowledge (from explicit to tacit). 
According to mainstream scholars, learning is a key condition for adaptation, i.e. the 
organizational capability to sense changes in its external environment and respond accordingly. 
Milliken [50] characterized the process of adaptation in terms of three main tasks. First, managers 
must scan their environment in order to identify the key trends, events and changes that might 
affect the performance of the organization. Second, they must identify the key threats and 
opportunities inherent in these changes. Such task requires that managers assess the meaning and 
significance of each change they noticed during the scanning phase. Third, they must take actions 
in response to environmental changes.  
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More recently, Teece et al. [60] introduced the term ‘dynamic capabilities’ to encompass the 
adaptive skills of organizations: dynamic capabilities are “the firm’s processes that use resources 
– specifically the processes to integrate, reconfigure, gain and release resources - to match and 
even create market change. Dynamic capabilities thus are the organizational and strategic 
routines by which firms achieve new resource configurations as markets emerge, collide, split, 
evolve, and die.” More specifically, dynamic capabilities consist in the three capacities: (a) to 
sense and shape opportunities and threats; (b) to seize opportunities; and (c) to maintain 
competitiveness through enhancing, combining, protecting, and, when necessary, reconfiguring 
the enterprise’s intangible and tangible assets [2].  
Following the work of Teece and colleagues, Doz and Kosonen [63] introduced the concept 
of ‘strategic agility’ for explaining how adaptive skills are activated in organizations. Strategic 
agility is” the ability to continuously adjust and adapt strategic direction in core business, as a 
function of strategic ambitions and changing circumstances, and create not just new product and 
services, but also new business models and innovative ways to create value for a company.” They 
described strategic agility as the ‘thoughtful and purposive interplay’ on the part of top 
management between three ‘meta-capabilities’: a) strategic sensitivity: the sharpness of 
perception of, and the intensity of awareness and attention to, strategic developments; b) resource 
fluidity: the internal capability to reconfigure capabilities and redeploy resources rapidly; c) 
leadership unity: the ability of the top team to make bold, fast decisions, without being bogged 
down in top-level ‘win-lose’ politics.  
 
3. First mover advantages, organizational memories and the value of strategic foresight  
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In the previous section, first we analysed the concept of environmental uncertainty and then we 
drew from mainstream literature on strategic planning and organizational learning to explore 
different approaches for coping with environmental uncertainty. In this section of the paper we 
focus on strategic foresight and we try to shed light on its role and contribution to the long-term 
performance of the organization. In particular, we draw from the basic principles of both the 
planning school and the learning school and we thus explore the potential benefits and limits 
inherent in the use of foresight for sustaining strategic decision making. 
 
3.1 Organizational memory and “memory of the future” 
Practitioners and scholars in the field of strategic foresight generally agree that its role in 
handling uncertainty is not to predict the future but to prepare the organization for dealing with it 
[64,65,66].  
The most relevant description of the learning process that strategic foresight would induce is 
based on the concept of ‘memory of the future’, through which professor David Ingvar explores 
how the human brain deals with the future. According to Ingvar [62, p.128], human brains 
constantly probe the conditions of the outside world and then immediately look at the actions 
they can take, in a constant sequence, on alternative paths that run into different futures. He thus 
observed that “concepts about the future, like memories of past events, can be remembered, often 
in great details”: human brains not only construct but also store these alternative time paths, 
which become “memories of the future”. ‘Memories of the future’ offer important insights into 
the ability of human beings to learn and adapt: the more time paths are stored, i.e. the more 
memories of the future are built, the more individuals are able to recognize and make sense of 
changes in their external environment. ‘Memories of the future’ form the basis for anticipation 
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and expectation as well as for the short and long-term planning of goal-oriented behaviours: 
human beings use these memories for extracting meaningful information from the enormous and 
random sensory noise to which the brain is continuously exposes. Without a ‘memory of the 
future’, such extraction would not be possible.  
Despite its original root in human neurobiology, the topic of “memory of the future” closely 
resembles the mainstream research field in literature on organizational learning and, more 
specifically, ‘organizational memory’.  This term is used to refer to the experiential knowledge of 
the organization, that is the accumulated body of data, information, beliefs and routines that the 
organization creates throughout its whole history and past experience [68,69,61]. It thus 
encompasses the collection of knowledge-based resources, both explicit (i.e., organizational 
archives like data bases) and tacit (i.e., individual memories) that organizations have at their 
disposal for facing external changes.  
Organizational memory is considered to influence the strategic response of firms and thereby 
their performances in dynamic environments by reflecting the knowledge developed from their 
past experience into their present and future actions. Specifically, according to Walsh and 
Ungson [68: p. 73] it plays three relevant roles: first, it plays an informational role which helps 
decision makers select and make sense of signals from their external environment; second, it 
fulfils a coordination function that reduces the transaction costs that are often associated with the 
implementation of new decisions; third, it plays a political role which allows individuals (or 
groups of individuals) in power to influence the actions of others.  
Together, the literature on organizational memory and the work from Ingvar suggest that the 
main role of strategic foresight is to allow the organization to build its own collective “memories 
of futures” – exactly as experiential knowledge enables it to develop its “memories of the past”. 
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The “memories of the future” that organizations build through strategic foresight complement 
their “memories of the past”, as decision makers are faced with new and different kinds of 
changes from the ones they had previously experienced. Strategic foresight and organizational 
‘memories of the future’ involve exactly the four stages of the learning and knowledge creation 
process described by Nonaka and Takeuchi. As human have many organs of perceptions  - i.e. 
ears, eyes, touch, sense and smell – that allow them to depict signals from the outside world, 
organizations have many channels, sources, and media through which they learn about new 
events, trends and changes in their external environment [70,71,72,73,74]. These channels and 
sources might be both internal (e.g., employees, middle and senior managers) and external 
(rivals, suppliers, consultants, academics), formal (press media, web sources, conferences) or 
informal (meetings, social events). This basic knowledge about trends and changes in the external 
environment is then elaborated collectively by the members if the organizations through such 
techniques as scenarios and roadmapping, which foster the: 
a) Socialization of tacit knowledge about changes in the external environment: strategic 
foresight involves a series of workshops and meetings through which middle and senior 
managers from different divisions and functions share their insights and perceptions about 
changes and new events in their external environments. Such workshops, which usually involve 
also external experts (e.g., academics, consultants), allow executives to share information (e.g., 
quantitative data and personal opinions and evaluations) about the likely evolution of external 
changes, their likely impact on the organization, and the likely response options. The direct 
interaction between people with different backgrounds (e.g., R&D, marketing, operations) tends 
to foster provocative thinking: the use of metaphors turns out to be quite effective for conveying 
intimate ideas and beliefs [75]. A metaphor is a way not only of communicating, but also of 
  - 22 - 
perceiving; it’s a way of sharing experiences by means of images, symbols, behaviours, rather 
than formal rules or routines;  
b) articulation of tacit knowledge about changes in the external environment into explicit 
knowledge: middle and senior managers translate their visions about the likely evolution of 
external changes, their impact on the organization and the suitable response options into a set of 
coherent pictures, like scenarios and roadmaps. Scenario building and roadmapping require the 
managers of the organizations to elaborate some formal models and conceptual frameworks, 
which define the most relevant changes and explore their mutual linkages and interactions over 
time: these formal models, i.e. alternative scenarios or roadmaps, become the explicit “memories 
of the future” of the organization; 
c) combination of explicit knowledge about changes in the external environment: the 
outcomes of strategic foresight, i.e. scenarios or roadmaps, are shared throughout the 
organization and made available also to those members who were not directly involved in the 
foresight process;  
d) internalization of explicit knowledge about changes in the external environment into tacit 
knowledge: through their ‘memories of the future’, senior and middle managers  sharpen their 
ability to detect new events and changes in their external environment and seize the opportunities 
and threats these changes bring to the long-term competitiveness of the organization [76]. 
In this way, strategic foresight lays the foundations for an ongoing process through which 
new knowledge (tacit and explicit) about changes in the external environment is continuously 
gained and the ‘memories of the future’ of the organization are continuously updated and revised 
by its members through the collective processes of socialization, articulation, combination and 
internalization. 
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Table 1 compares the development of “memory of the future” by individuals with the 
development of organizational “memories of the future”, by summing up the main similarities 
and differences. 
 
Table 1 about here 
 
3.2 Memory of the future, first mover (late mover) advantages, and long-term value 
In the previous section, we draw from literature on organizational learning and organizational 
memory to argue that strategic foresight is a continuous process which allows the firm to build 
and renew over time its collective ‘memories of the future’. We now go deeply into this concept, 
by exploring whether and how such collective memories enhance long-term performances. 
Mainstream scholars in literature on strategic planning devoted a lot of efforts into identifying 
the first mover advantages  that a firm might achieve by anticipating changes in its external 
environments. According these scholars, we argue that the core role of strategic foresight is 
exactly to allow organizations to build ‘memories of emerging (i.e., future) sources of first mover 
advantages’. Of course, no technique and process might be designed to predict the future “as it 
exactly will be”, by fully anticipating the impact and response to external changes: scholars in the 
learning schools of strategic management  and even in the field of corporate foresight largely 
agree on this conclusion [57,26,37]. But what strategic foresight efforts should still be able to 
envisage are the likely sources of first mover advantages, so as to give decision makers the 
opportunity to address these sources in a timely and profitable way. Once first mover advantages 
have been depicted, a firm might get a head start in the development or acquisition of the key 
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resources – i.e. assets and capabilities – which underlie the concrete achievement of these 
advantages.  
As they use strategic foresight to depict promptly drivers of change in their external 
environment and to reflect upon the first mover advantages these changes might bring about, 
decision makers build their “memories” of the future opportunities and threats they will have to 
deal with. In this way, they increase exactly their “power of perception”: they “hear” and make 
sense of the relevant signals that anticipate the rise of first mover advantages, like technological 
capabilities, scarce assets, customers’ switching costs. They thus gain a head start in the 
development or pre-emption of these advantages, by adapting to their changing environment 
more quickly and more effectively than their rivals. 
Literature on organizational memory shows that the ability of the organization to cope with 
external changes depends on the knowledge it had previously acquired through its own past 
experience: as this experience has a degree of similarity with external changes, it provides a 
helpful basis on which the organization can rely for crafting its strategic response [68,69,76]. The 
value of strategic foresight lies exactly in enabling decision-makers to experience the future 
sources of first mover advantages before they actually take place, i.e. to build their ‘memories’ of 
future sources of first mover advantages: as these memories embrace the rising sources of first 
mover advantages, strategic foresight will provide the organization a helpful basis for crafting its 
response to its changing environment.  
Strategic foresight and first mover advantages thereby are strictly intertwined. On the one 
hand we emphasize the role that the anticipation of sources of first mover advantages has in order 
to strategic foresight be valuable. On the other hand, first mover advantages stem from changes in 
the external environment: only the firms that recognize these changes promptly, will be 
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eventually able to benefit from them [53]. Strategic foresight involves precisely the capabilities 
of organizations to identify the first mover opportunities stemming from market and 
technological changes: firms need strategic foresight in order to enhance these capabilities [78].  
The case of Nokia, which in the early 2000s successfully adapted to deep changes in its 
industry, provides a compelling example. To prepare itself for 3G and the convergences of digital 
technologies into mobile communication, Nokia established in the 2001 a formal and systematic 
process for carrying out strategic foresight [79]. 3G (and allied advances in microelectronics and 
software) promoted the convergence of a wide range of digital sectors - mobile voice 
communications, software, e-mail and web-surfing, information, multimedia, imaging, music, 
games, entertainment and consumer electronics - into one broader industry area, with the promise 
of new market segments being established. Nokia’s foresight efforts led the company to build a 
set of product and technology roadmaps through which it envisaged, in the mid 2000s, the desire 
of mobile phone customers for digital imaging, game and music and the rise of completely new 
product categories (e.g., camera phones) setting apart from traditional cell phones. Nokia’s 
roadmaps clearly anticipated the opportunity for early movers into the converging digital markets 
to disrupt traditional phones and to gain a competitive edge over rivals by means of leading 
technological skills in imaging, games and music and by means of new product models which 
could allow to pre-empt customers’ perceptual space. Nokia’s roadmaps thus spurred the 
company to develop such technological skills (both hardware and software, through experience 
curve and patents) and allied capabilities in manufacturing (production capacity) and marketing 
(brand), through which it launched new product models (e.g., the Nseries) and increased its 
market leadership in the second half of the 2000s.  
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On the other hand, if strategic foresight is not able to anticipate the emerging sources of first 
mover advantages or even mistake first mover advantages for late mover advantages, it will 
actually increase the inertia of the organization rather than its adaptive skills. Literature on 
organizational memory and, more generally, managerial cognition strongly emphasized that the 
strategic beliefs that the organization has developed through its past experience are likely to 
doom its faith when they are not aligned with the shifting environment, i.e. when they lack 
proximity with the new knowledge required to address external changes [80,81,82]. In the same 
way, firms that fail to anticipate first mover advantages are going to develop strategic beliefs 
about first mover opportunities (and threats) that actually will not establish, thus moving away 
their strategic focus from the real actions they require to adapt to their shifting business.  
The case of Nokia, with its recent struggles, provides again a compelling example with 
regard to this issue. Such struggles were due to major mistakes in anticipating the challenges that 
mobile Internet brought about. Nokia predicted that being the first mobile phone manufacturer to 
move into the nascent market of mobile Internet would give it a sound advantage: network 
externalities would establish its Symbian operating system as the industry standard. Indeed, in the 
mid 2000s Symbian was the ruling platform in the industry. But this edge did not last for a long 
time: as they entered the mobile Internet market in 2007 and 2008 respectively, both Apple and 
Google – that could exploit the software skills they had originally developed in the PC industry - 
quickly established their iOS and Android operating systems over Symbian.  
In the face of Apple and Google, the only choice available for established mobile phone 
manufacturers was to pursue late mover advantages, by waiting for the resolution of market 
uncertainty and the rise of the winning operating system: that was exactly what Samsung did, 
when it embraced Android in 2009.  
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The chances of organizations to survive in dynamic environments depend exactly on the 
ability to understand when their “memories” of the future are not aligned with real future, i.e. 
when the sources of first mover advantages they have predicted are not going to rise. Firms 
thereby should carefully use strategic foresight, by fully recognizing that predictions (even in the 
form of alternative visions) are not the real future but a way of preparing for the future and thus 
by emphasizing the process of foresight instead of the output of foresight (e.g., scenarios or 
roadmaps) . On this regard, Ahlqvist et al. [83: p.824] introduce the concept of anticipatory 
capacity to emphasize the relevance of the organizational capability to “continuously reflect on 
one’s own actions against systematically formed strategic views of the future, and to change 
one’s own behaviour and/or strategic view of the future when necessary”. Strategic foresight 
should be framed as an ongoing activity, through which firms relentlessly looks for new events 
that allow them to inform new strategic views about first mover advantages and revise in case 
their initial views. Contextually, it is worth noting that first mover advantages require a high 
propensity for risk-taking. Tools like strategic options might be very helpful to gain a head start 
but, at the same, not the obligation to further develop and/or acquire the sources of first mover 
advantages - i.e. scarce assets, technological and marketing capabilities, customer switching costs 
- which the firm has initially envisaged. Strategic options might thus contribute to enable 
organizations to escape the trap of being ‘locked into’ the future which they have foreseen and in 
the mistakes which might be inherent in this future. 
 
4. Discussion  
We add to the study of decision making in uncertain environments, our core contribution being a 
conceptual framework of the value that strategic foresight might create in relation to fast 
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adaptation and long-term performances [84]. We focus on the role of corporate foresight in 
building “memories” of future sources of first mover advantages which allow organizations to 
recognize (i.e., coping with effect uncertainty) and address (i.e., coping with response 
uncertainty) these sources more promptly and more profitably than rivals that do not use 
foresight. Figure 1 summarizes our conceptual framework. 
 
Figure 1 about here 
 
We started by noting that the work on strategic foresight has garnered much attention by scholars 
and practitioners. However, with its success and wide diffusion also have come some pitfalls. 
One can easily see from a search for ‘strategic foresight’ and “corporate foresight” on the web 
how loosely the terms have become to be used and how they have become separated from their 
theoretical basis. Therefore, a reconsideration of the nature of corporate foresight efforts and their 
role in strategic decision making – in terms of either enhanced learning and adaptive skills or, 
conversely, inertia – is required.  We propose this work on corporate foresight as a springboard 
which might serve to formulate several important issues that have remained unresolved from both 
an academic and managerial perspective.  
Our main contribution concerns the long running debate between the planning and the learning 
schools of strategic management on the role of prediction in strategy formulation. On the one 
hand, our model is consistent with the core tenet of the planning school - that an organization 
should try hard to predict changes and new events. We argue that, in turbulent environments, 
more foresightful firms, that plan their strategic moves in advance, can pre-empt emerging 
market opportunities and prevent the entry of competitors who rely simply on adaptation. On the 
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other hand, our model emphasizes that the value of strategic foresight lies not just in the 
alternative visions of the future it provides, but more in how it fosters a process of ‘planned 
learning’ about the future, by allowing the organization to be ready to adapt to changing 
situations as they develop.  
The concept of ‘planned learning’ was originally introduced by Vecchiato [38] as he 
described foresight activities in corporate organizations. This paper further explores this concept 
and strongly advance our understanding of it. We draw from the research streams of first mover 
(dis) advantages, organizational memories and strategic agility in order to provide a fully original 
theoretical framework, which sheds light on the circumstances under which strategic foresight 
might really enable ‘panned learning’ processes (and thus value creation) in fast-paced 
environments. Contextually, we shed light on the circumstances under which foresight efforts 
might increase the inertia of the organization instead. 
The concept of “planned learning” we develop in this paper, echoes the theme advanced 
recently by several prominent scholars that connects rational planning with effective adaptation 
[1,85]. First of all, our study of strategic foresight is rooted in the dynamic capabilities view of 
the organization [60,86]. Teece [2] identifies dynamic capabilities as the capacities to sense, seize 
and reconfigure, and explores the firm’s skills, procedures and processes – to which he refers as 
microfoundations - that underpin dynamic capabilities. Strategic foresight, through its input into 
the firm’s capacities to learn about its shifting environment, involve precisely the 
microfoundations of dynamic capabilities. By addressing the future state of external changes 
(‘state uncertainty’), strategic foresight serves the organization as microfoundation of the 
capacity to sense emerging opportunities and threats; by addressing the future effects of external 
changes (‘effect’ uncertainty), it serves as microfoundation of the capacity to seize the rising 
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sources of first mover advantages; and by addressing response options to external changes 
(‘response’ uncertainty), it serves as microfoundation of the capacity to concretely gain first 
mover advantages, by expanding its technological and marketing capabilities, creating customer’s 
switching costs, and pre-empting scarce assets. 
In particular, our conceptual framework builds on the work of Doz and Kosonen [63] on 
“strategic agility”. By exploring the linkages between strategic foresight, organizational learning 
and first mover advantages, we deepen our understanding of the relationships between strategic 
foresight and strategic agility and the three microfoundations of strategic agility, i.e. strategic 
sensitivity, resource fluidity and leadership unity. Through the building of organizational 
‘memories of the futures’, strategic foresight enhances the ‘strategic sensitivity’ of managers, i.e. 
their ability to recognize and interpret changes in the external environment. By exploring the 
rising sources of first mover advantages, strategic foresight fosters the capability of the 
organization to redeploy its resources rapidly so as to achieve and benefit from such advantages; 
finally, collective “memories of the futures” sustain cohesion and sharing of long-term aims 
throughout the organization. We thus respond to the calls for deeper investigation of the links 
between organizational processes, strategic agility and performance in fast-paced environments 
[85].  
 
5. Conclusions 
Our work focuses on strategic foresight and its role in enhancing the long-term performances of 
the organization. We draw from three different research streams: the first one is literature on 
environmental uncertainty, a concept which we carefully re-examine in this paper; the second one 
is literature on strategic planning and first mover advantages; the third one is literature on 
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organizational learning and organizational memories. Our work thus offers interesting 
opportunities for scholars who aim at deepening our understanding of the linkages between these 
research streams and their role in shaping the responses of organizations to environmental 
changes [38]. Scholars should develop a framework for becoming increasingly aware of the real 
value-added of strategic foresight – i.e., potential benefits and limits - and thus for profitably 
embedding it within the mainstream routines and processes of the organization [87]. A relevant 
field of research regards in particular how strategic beliefs about sources of first mover 
advantages take root among decision makers and whether and under what circumstances such 
beliefs might be exploited – or changed - successfully [80,81]. Finally, one of the most critical 
issues in foresight is wild card analysis: a wild card is a description of an event that is assumed to 
be improbable, but which would have large and serious consequences for the organization [88]. A 
relevant avenue for future research efforts regards the exploration of the relationships between 
wild card analysis and organizational ‘memories of the future’, and the ways these relationships 
contribute to enhance the resilience of the firm [89].  
By conceptualizing strategic foresight as a “planned learning” process about the future which 
enhances the adaptive skills of the organization, we hope to respond to criticism regarding its 
usefulness and value in strategic management, so as to increase discussion among scholars 
[57,90]. As they further explore the linkages between the research streams on strategic foresight, 
organizational memories and first mover advantages we outlined in this paper, joint efforts of 
scholars and practitioners can improve our knowledge and use of strategic foresight in ways that 
are consistent with the principles of the dynamic capabilities and strategic agility views – and that 
seamlessly embed foresight in these research frameworks.   
  - 32 - 
References 
1. R. M. Grant, Strategic Planning in a Turbulent Environment: Evidence from the oil 
majors, Strategic Management Journal, 24 (49) (2003) 491 517.  
2. D.J. Teece, Explicating dynamic capabilities: the nature and microfoundations of 
(sustainable) enterprise performance,  Strategic Management Journal, 28 (13) (2007) 1319 
1350. 
3. M. L. Tushman, C. OReilly. Ambidextrous Organizations: Managing evolutionaty and 
revolutionary change, California Management Review, 38 (1996) 8 30.  
4. Y. Sheffi. The Resilient Enterprise, MIT Press, Boston, 2005. 
5. C. Chapman, S. Ward, Project risk management: processes, techniques and insights, John 
Wiley, Chichester, 1996.  
6. A. De Meyer, C. H. Loch, M. T. Pich, Managing project uncertainty: from variation to 
chaos, Sloan Management Review 43 (2002) 60 67. 
7. P. Bromiley, Corporate Capital Investment: A Behavioural Approach. Cambridge 
University Press, New York, 1986. 
8. J. R. Graham, C. R. Harvey, The theory and practice of corporate finance: evidence from 
the field, Journal of Financial Economics 60 (2001) 187-243. 
9. H. E. Leland, Agency costs, risk management, and capital structure, The Journal of 
Finance 53 (1998) 1213 1243. 
10. A.L. Porter, B. Ashton, G. Clar, J.F. Coates, K. Cuhls, S.W. Cunningham, K. Ducatel, P. 
Van der Duin, L. Georghiou, T. Gordon, H. Linstone, V. Marchau, G. Massari, I. Miles, 
M. Mogee, A. Salo, F. Scapolo, R. Smits, W. Thissen. Technology Futures Analysis: 
  - 33 - 
Toward Integration of the Field and New Methods. Technological Forecasting and Social 
Change, 71 (3) (2004) 287 303. 
11. G. S. Day, P.J.H. Shoemaker, Peripheral Vision, Harvard Business School Press, Boston, 
MA,  2006  
12. D. C. Hambrick, Environmental scanning and organizational strategy,  Strategic 
Management Journal 2 (1982) 159 174. 
13. R.N. Kostoff, R. Boylan, G.R. Simons, Disruptive technology roadmaps, Technological 
Forecasting and Social Change, 71 (1-2) (2004) 141 159. 
14. L. Fahey, R. Randall, Learning From the Future, John Willey & Sons, New York, 1998. 
15. P. Schwartz, The Art of the Long View: Planning for the Future in an Uncertain World, 
Doubleday Currency, New York, 1991. 
16. M. Jefferson, Shell scenarios: What really happened in the 1970s and what may be 
learned for current world prospects. Technological Forecasting and Social Change 79 (1) 
(2012) 186 197. 
17. A.K. Dixit and R. S. Pindyck, Investment Under Uncertainty, Princeton University Press, 
Princeton, NJ, 1994.  
18. L. Trigeorgis, Real options. Managerial flexibility and strategy in resource allocation, 
MIT Press, Cambridge MA, 1996. 
19. M. Amram and N. Kulatilaka, Real Options: Managing Strategic Investment in an 
Uncertain World, Harvard Business School Press, Boston, MA, 1999. 
20. R. Linneman, H. Klein, The Use of Multiple Scenarios by US Industrial Companies: A 
Comparison Study 1977-1981, Long Range Planning 16 (6) (1983) 94 101.  
  - 34 - 
21. P. Malaska, Multiple Scenario Approach and Strategic Behaviour in European 
Companies, Strategic Management Journal 6 (1985) 339 366. 
22. P. Becker, Corporate Foresight in Europe: A First Overview, RTK2 Scientific and 
Technological Foresight, European Commission, 2002. 
23. K. Blind, K. Cuhls, H. Grupp, Current foresight activities in central Europe, 
Technological Forecasting and Social Change, 60(1) (1999) 15-35. 
24. R. Rohrbeck, S. Mahdjour, S. Knab, T. Freese. Benchmarking Report: Strategic Foresight 
in Multinational Companies. Berlin: European Corporate Foresight Group, 2009. 
25. C. Battistella. The organisation of Corporate Foresight: A multiple case study in the 
telecommunication industry, Technological Forecasting and Social Change, forthcoming.  
26. R. Bradley MacKay, L. A. Costanzo, Introduction, in Bradley MacKay, R. and Costanzo, 
L.A. (Eds.), Handbook of Research on Strategic Foresight, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham 
UK, 1 12, 2009. 
27. J. Coates, P. Durance, M. Godet, (Eds.), Strategic Foresight, Technological Forecasting 
and Social Change Special Issue 77 (9) (2010). 
28. R. Rohrbeck, H. G. Gemünden, Corporate Foresight: Its Three Roles in Enhancing the 
Innovation Capacity of a Firm, Technological Forecasting and Social Change, 78 (2) 
(2011) 231–243. 
29. R. Vecchiato, C. Roveda, Strategic foresight in corporate organizations: assessing the 
effect and response uncertainty of technology and social drivers of change, Technological 
Forecasting and Social Change 77 ( 9) (2010) 1527 1539. 
30. R. Vecchiato, Strategic Foresight and Environmental Uncertainty: A Research Agenda, 
Foresight 14 (5) (2012) 387-400. 
  - 35 - 
31. B. Martin. Foresight in Science and Technology, Technology Analysis & Strategic 
Management, 7 (1995) 139 168. 
32. E. Jantsch. Technological Forecasting in Perspective, OECD, 1967. 
33. R. Wiltbank, N. Dew, S. Read, S.D. Sarasvathy, What to Do Next? The Case for non-
Predictive Strategy, Strategic Management Journal, 27 (10) (2006) 981 998. 
34. C.S. Galbraith, G.B. Merrill, The Politics of Forecasting: Managing the Truth, California 
Management Review, 38 (2) (1996) 29 43.  
35. G. Hamel, Leading the revolution, Harvard Business School Press, Boston MA, 2000.  
36. P. Drucker, The new society of organizations. Harvard Business Review 72 (1992) 95 
104.  
37. A. De Geus, The Living Company, Harvard Business School Press, Boston, MA, 1997.  
38. R. Vecchiato, Environmental uncertainty, foresight and strategic decision making: an 
integrated study, Technological Forecasting and Social Change 79 (3) (2012) 436 447.  
39. R.B. Duncan, Characteristics of organizational environments and perceived 
Environmental uncertainty, Administrative Science Quarterly 17 (1972) 313 327.  
40. F. H. Knight, Risk, Uncertainty, and Profit, Hart, Schaffner & Marx, New York, 1921.  
41. J.G. March and H.A. Simon, Organizations, McGraw-Hill, New York, 1958. 
42. R. M. Cyert, J. C. March. A Behavioural Theory of the Firm. Prentice-Hall, Englewood 
Cliffs, 1963. 
43. J. D. Thompson. Organizations in Action. McGraw-Hill, NY, 1967. 
44. C. I. Barnard, The Functions of the Executive, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 
1938.  
  - 36 - 
45. P.R. Lawrence and J.W. Lorsch, Organization and Environment, Harvard University 
Press, Cambridge, MA, 1967.  
46. W.R. Dill, Environment as an influence on managerial autonomy, Administrative Science 
Quarterly, 2 (1958) 409 443. 
47. M.E. Porter, Competitive Strategy, The Free Press, New York, 1980. 
48. M. E. Porter, Competitive Advantage, Free Press, New York, 1985.  
49. C. M. Christensen. The Innovator’s Dilemma. Boston, MA: Harvard Business School 
Press, 1997.  
50. F. J. Milliken, Three types of perceived uncertainty about the environment: state, effect, 
and response uncertainty,  Academy of Management Review 12 (1987) 133 143. 
51. H. Courtney, 20/20 Foresight: Crafting Strategy in an Uncertain World, Harvard 
Business School Press, Boston, MA, 2001. 
52. H.I. Ansoff, Critique of Henry Mintzberg’s The Design School: reconsidering the basic 
premises of strategic management, Strategic Management Journal 12 (6) (1991) 449 461. 
53. M. B. Lieberman, D. B. Montgomery, First-mover advantages, Strategic Management 
Journal  9 (1988) 41 58. 
54. F. F. Suarez, G. Lanzolla, The Role of Environmental Dynamics in Building a First 
Mover Advantage Theory, Academy of Management Review 32 (2007) 377 392.  
55. M. B. Lieberman, D. B. Montgomery, First-mover (Dis)advantages: Retrospective and 
Link with the Resource-Based View, Strategic Management Journal 9 (1998) 1111 1125. 
56. Spence, The learning curve and competition, Bell Journal of Economics, 12 (1981) 49 70. 
57. H. Mintzberg, The design school: reconsidering the basic premises of strategic 
management, Strategic Management Journal 11 (3) (1990) 171 195. 
  - 37 - 
58. J.B. Quinn, Strategies for change: Logical Incrementalism, Dow-Jones-Irwin, 
Homewood, IL, 1980.  
59. R Nelson, S. Winter. An Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change, Harvard University 
Press, Boston, 1982. 
60. D. J. Teece, G. Pisano, A. Shuen. Dynamic capabilities and strategic management. 
Strategic Management Journal, 18 (1997) 509 533.  
61. B. Levitt, J. C. March. Organizational Learning. Annual Review of Sociology 14 (1988) 
319 340.   
62. I. Nonaka, H. Takeuchi, The Knowledge-Creating Company: How Japanese Companies 
Create the Dynamics of Innovation, Oxford University Press, New York, 1995. 
63. Y. Doz, M. Kosonen, Fast Strategy: How Strategic Agility Will Help You Stay Ahead of 
the Game Wharton School Publishing, Philadelphia, PA, 2008.  
64. H. Tsoukas, J. Shepherd, Introduction: organization and the future, from forecasting to 
foresight, in Tsoukas, H. and Shepherd, J. (Eds.) Managing the Future: Foresight in the 
Knowledge Economy, Blackwell, London, (2004) 1 19.  
65. K. van der Heijden, R. Bradfield, G. Burt, G. Crains, G. Wright G. The Sixth Sense: 
Accelerating Organisational Learning with Scenarios, Wiley, Chichester, 2002.  
66. J. O. Schwarz, Assessing the future of futures studies in management, Futures 40 (3) 
(2008) 237-246. 
67. D. H. Ingvar, Memory of the future: an essay on the temporal organization of conscious 
awareness, Human Neurobiology 4 (3) (1985) 127 136. 
68. J. P. Walsh,  G. R. Ungson, Organizational Memory, Academy of Management Review, 
16 (1991) 57-91.  
  - 38 - 
69. V. Anand, C. C. Manz, W. H. Glick, An organizational memory approach to 
information management, Academy of Management Review 23 (1998) 796-209. 
70. F.J. Aguilar, Scanning the Business Environment, McMillan, New York, 1967.  
71. R.L. Daft, J. Sormunen, D. Parks, Chief executive scanning, environmental 
characteristics, and company performance: an empirical study, Strategic Management 
Journal 9 (1988) 123 139. 
72. D S. Elenkov, Strategic Uncertainty and Environmental Scanning: the Case for 
Institutional Influences on Scanning Behaviour, Strategic Management Journal 18 (4) 
(1997) 287 302. 
73. B. K. Boyd, J. Fulk, Executive scanning and perceived uncertainty: a multidimensional 
model, Journal of Management 22 (1) (1996) 1 22.  
74. R. May, W. Stewart W, R. Sweo R., Environmental scanning in a transitional economy, 
Academy of Management Journal 43 (2000) 403 427.  
75. C. Roveda, R. Vecchiato R. Foresight and Innovation in the context of industrial clusters: 
the case of some Italian districts, Technological Forecasting and Social Change 75 (2008) 
817-833. 
76. A. Geus, keynote speech ‘The Living Company—Long Term Thinking in a Changing 
Society,’ presented at the In the Long Run Conference, Berlin, Germany, October 18, 
2004. See In the Long Run, (2005), Burmsteir, K. and Neef, A. (Eds.). Oekom: Munich, 
Germany. 
  - 39 - 
77. J. P. Walsh, Managerial and organizational cognition: Notes from a trip down 
memory lane, Organization Science, 6 (1995) 280 321.  
78. J. B Barney, D. J. Ketchen, M. Wright. The future of the resource-based theory: 
revitalization or decline? Journal of Management 37 (2011) 1299 1315. 
79. R. Vecchiato, C. Roveda. Foresight in Corporate Organizations, Technology Analysis & 
Strategic Management, 22 (2010) 99 112. 
80. S. Kaplan, M. Tripsas, Thinking about technology: applying a cognitive lens to technical 
change, Research Policy 37 (2008) 790 805.  
81. M. Tripsas, G. Gavetti, G. Capabilities, cognition, and inertia: evidence from digital 
imaging. Strategic Management Journal 21 (2000) 1147 1162. 
82. R. Adner, C. Helfat, C. Corporate effects and dynamic managerial capabilities. Strategic 
Management Journal 24 (2003) 1011 1025. 
83. T. Ahlqvist, M. Halonen, A. Eerola, S. Kivisaari, J. Kohl, R. Koivisto, J. Myllyoja, N. 
Wessberg, Systemic transformation, anticipatory culture, and knowledge spaces: 
constructing organisational capacities in roadmapping projects at VTT Technical 
Research Centre of Finland. Technology Analysis & Strategic Management 24 (2012) 
821 841. 
84. R. Rohrbeck, Exploring value creation form corporate foresight activities, Futures 44 (5)  
(2012) 440 452. 
85. K. M Eisenhardt, N. R. Furr, C. B. Bingham, Microfoundations of performance: 
Balancing efficiency and flexibility in dynamic environments, Organization Science, 21 
(2010) 1263 1273. 
  - 40 - 
86. K. M Eisenhardt,, J. A. Martin. Dynamic capabilities: what are they? Strategic 
Management Journal 21 (2000) 1105 1121. 
87. C. Battistella, A. F. De Toni. A methodology of technology foresight:  A proposal and 
field study, Technological Forecasting and Social Change 78 (2011) 1029 1048. 
88. S. Mendonça, M. P. Cunha, J. Kaivo-oja, F. Ruff. Wild Cards, Weak Signals and 
Organisational Improvisation, Futures, 36 (2004) 201 218. 
89. D. Barton. Capitalism for the long term, Harvard Business Review,  89 (2011) 83   
90.  R. Vecchiato, Strategic Foresight: Matching Environmental uncertainty, Technology 
Analysis and Strategic Management, 24(8) (2012) 783 796.  
 
  - 41 - 
Biographical Note 
Riccardo Vecchiato is Assistant Professor at the Department of Management, Economics and 
Industrial Engineering of Politecnico di Milano, Italy. In 2005 he has been visiting researcher 
at the Manchester Business School, University of Manchester. His main research fields are 
foresight methodologies and strategic management of technology and innovation. On these 
themes he has presented at international conferences (e.g., Academy of Management, 
Strategic Management Society) and published on international journals like Research Policy, 
Technological Forecasting and Social Change, Technology Analysis and Strategic 
Management, International Journal of Foresight and Innovation Policy. He has been 
consultant for large firms and governmental bodies in Italy and abroad in several foresight 
projects. 
 
  - 42 - 
Table 1: Comparing the “memory of the future” of individuals with the “memory of the future” 
of organizations: similarities and differences. 
Memory of the future Individuals Organizations 
Sources of information 
Organs of perceptions  - i.e. 
ears, eyes, touch, sense and 
smell. 
Internal sources (e.g., 
employees, middle and senior 
managers).  
External sources (rivals, 
suppliers, consultants, 
academics). 
Formal sources (press media, 
web sources, conferences).  
Informal sources (meetings, 
social events). 
Building process 
a) Probing the conditions of 
the outside world.  
b) Looking at the actions that 
might be taken on alternative 
paths that run into different 
futures. 
c) Storing alternative actions 
and futures. 
a) Socialization of tacit 
knowledge about changes in 
the external environment. 
b) Articulation of tacit 
knowledge about changes in 
the external environment into 
explicit knowledge. 
c) Combination of explicit 
knowledge about changes in 
the external environment. 
d) Internalization of explicit 
knowledge about changes in 
the external environment into 
tacit knowledge. 
  
 
